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End-of-life actions are commonin intensive care units (ICUs)around the world (1–4). De-spite a widespread perception
of excessive and inappropriate use of life-
sustaining technology, withholding or
withdrawing of treatment occurs in more
than two thirds of patients dying in ICUs
(1, 4) and has actually increased (5). The
use of aggressive therapy has decreased
(5–7). While in the past most patients
died in ICUs after cardiopulmonary resus-
citation (CPR) (8), presently only approx-
imately 20% of ICU patients who die un-
dergo CPR (1, 4).
Discussions of end-of-life practices in
ICUs generally imply that the lines be-
tween these practices are clear and well
defined. Actions undertaken in the care of
dying patients are grouped into distinct
categories, including CPR, withholding or
withdrawing treatment, and active eutha-
nasia or active shortening of the dying pro-
cess (SDP) (1–5). Active euthanasia or SDP
is assumed to be distinct from legal and
ethically acceptable practices, such as with-
holding and withdrawing treatment.
Even though limitation of therapy is
common, active euthanasia is controver-
sial and only legal in The Netherlands and
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Objective: End-of-life practices vary worldwide. The objective
was to demonstrate that there is no clear-cut distinction between
treatments administered to relieve pain and suffering and those
intended to shorten the dying process.
Design: Secondary analysis of a prospective, observational
study.
Setting: Thirty-seven intensive care units in 17 European coun-
tries.
Patients: Consecutive patients dying or with any limitation of
therapy.
Interventions: Evaluation of the type of end-of-life category;
dates and times of intensive care unit admission, death, or
discharge; and decisions to limit therapy, medication, and doses
used for active shortening of the dying process and the intent of
the doctors prescribing the medication.
Measurements and Main Results: Limitation of life-sustaining
therapy occurred in 3,086 (72.6%) of 4,248 patients, and 94 (2.2%)
underwent active shortening of the dying process. Medication for
active shortening of the dying process included administration of
opiates (morphine to 71 patients) or benzodiazepines (diazepam
to 54 patients) alone or in combination. The median dosage for
morphine was 25.0 mg/hr and for diazepam 20.8 mg/hr. Doses of
opiates and benzodiazepines were no higher than mean doses
used with withdrawal in previous studies in 20 of 66 patients and
were within the ranges of doses used in all but one patient.
Doctors considered that medications for active shortening of the
dying process definitely led to the patient’s death in 72 patients
(77%), probably led to the patient’s death in 11 (12%), and were
unlikely to have led to death in 11 (12%) patients.
Conclusions: There is a gray area in end-of-life care between
treatments administered to relieve pain and suffering and
those intended to shorten the dying process. (Crit Care Med
2008; 36:8–13)
KEY WORDS: end-of-life decisions; euthanasia; shortening the
dying process; withdrawing treatment; intensive care units; dou-
ble effect
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Belgium (on the patient’s direct request)
(9, 10), and physician-assisted suicide is
only allowed in Switzerland and Oregon
in the United States (11). In these coun-
tries, where the law defines euthanasia as
the act of deliberately terminating the life
of another person at his or her request,
active euthanasia practiced in the ICU for
incompetent patients would be viewed as
illegal. Palliative care, on the other hand,
is widely practiced and encouraged (12).
It is well known that the same medica-
tions given to ease pain and suffering can
potentially cause or hasten death. It is
exceedingly difficult to determine
whether and when relief measures are
undertaken with the implicit or explicit
intention to shorten the dying process as
opposed to just relieve pain and suffering.
Only three studies have examined the
use of life-shortening practices in adult
ICUs. In an attitudinal survey conducted in
16 European countries, 40% of physicians
admitted to sometimes deliberately admin-
istering drugs to patients with no hope of
survival until death ensues (13). The ETHI-
CUS study documented SDP in seven of 17
European countries (4). Asch (14) noted
that 17% of critical care nurses were asked
by patients or relatives to perform eutha-
nasia or assist in suicide, and 16% reported
that they had engaged in such practices.
The purpose of this article is to make
the argument and show evidence that
there is no clear-cut distinction between
treatments administered to relieve pain
and suffering when withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment and those intended
to shorten the dying process. An in-depth
examination of this gray area in end-of-
life care has important moral and ethical
implications for the practice of intensive
care medicine. It also has implications for
other acute care areas, long-term care, and
community care, where there are similar
concerns about pain management vs. ac-
tively assisting in the dying process. The
article elaborates on the previous report
(4), which only briefly touched on the find-
ings on SDP. It analyzes the overlap be-
tween SDP and other end-of-life practices
relying on three variables: doses of poten-
tially life-shortening intravenous drugs, the
time for patients to die after limitation of
therapy, and the intent of the doctors who
prescribed the medications.
METHODS
Study Population. This report is a second-
ary analysis of a previous prospective study (4).
All consecutive adult patients who died or had
any limitation of lifesaving interventions in the
ICU from January 1, 1999, to June 30, 2000,
were studied prospectively (4). Patients were fol-
lowed until discharge from ICU, death, or 2
months from the decision to limit therapy (4).
Definitions of End-of-Life Categories. End-
of-life categories were defined prospectively as
CPR, brain death, withholding life-sustaining
treatment, withdrawing life-sustaining treat-
ment, and SDP as previously reported (4). SDP
was defined in the questionnaire as a circum-
stance in which someone performed an act
with the specific intent of shortening the dy-
ing process. These acts did not include with-
holding or withdrawing treatment, and exam-
ples included intentional overdose of
narcotics, anesthetics, or potassium chloride
(4). A hierarchy for categorizing patients used
the more active mode of limitation if more
than one was recorded. Patients were classi-
fied as “withhold” only if that was the sole
limitation made; “withdraw” included patients
for whom treatment was both withheld and
withdrawn; and “SDP” included cases involv-
ing withholding or withdrawing and SDP de-
cisions.
Ethical and Legal Considerations. No in-
terventions or treatments were given, with-
held, or withdrawn from patients as part of the
initial observational study (4). Countries, cen-
ters, and study patients were coded anony-
mously to ensure confidentiality and to allow
clinicians to report practices of questionable
legality. Individual institutional ethics com-
mittee approval with a waiver of informed con-
sent was required and obtained from each par-
ticipating institution.
Study Centers and Data Collection. Na-
tional representatives of the Ethics Section of
the European Society of Intensive Care Medi-
cine coordinated the study for each country’s
participating ICUs. The prospectively collected
data used specifically for this secondary anal-
ysis included type of end-of-life category (SDP
and other categories were self-identified by the
responsible physician) and dates and times of
1) ICU admission; 2) death or discharge; and
3) decisions to limit therapy, medication, and
doses used for SDP and the intent of the doc-
tors prescribing the medication or extubation.
Physicians retrospectively classified the acts
used for SDP as definitely, probably, or prob-
ably not the cause of the patient’s death.
Statistical Analyses. Relative potency
scales for analgesics were expressed in paren-
teral morphine equivalents (10 mg of mor-
phine sulfate ! 0.15 mg of fentanyl citrate !
0.0075 mg of sufentanil citrate) and sedatives
in parenteral diazepam equivalents (10 mg of
diazepam ! 5 mg of midazolam) (3, 15). Drug
doses were bolus or cumulative doses given
over time. Differences in the numbers of with-
drawals of endotracheal tubes were tested with
the Fisher’s exact test, and times from with-
drawal of endotracheal tubes until death were
tested by the Mann-Whitney test. Descriptive
statistics for time variables are presented as
median and interquartile range (IQR). Those
variables are markedly skewed, and therefore
differences were tested using the nonparamet-
ric Kruskal-Wallis rank test. The Cox propor-
tional-hazards model was used to evaluate the
association between drug doses and time from
SDP to death. The hazard ratios are expressed
for a 10-mg/hr increase of either morphine or
diazepam. Differences were considered signif-
icant if p " .05.
RESULTS
During the initial study, 31,417 pa-
tients were admitted to ICUs in 37 cen-
ters located in 17 countries (4). Of the
31,417 patients, 4,248 who died or had
limitations of life-sustaining treatments
comprised the study population. Limita-
tion of life-sustaining therapy occurred in
3,086 (72.6%) of 4,248 patients, 9.8% of
all ICU admissions, and 76.0% of dying
patients. The frequencies of the different
end-of-life categories were as follows: 832
(19.6%) of the patients received CPR, 330
(7.8%) were diagnosed with brain death,
1,594 (37.5%) had therapies withheld,
1,398 (32.9%) had therapies withdrawn,
and 94 (2.2%) underwent SDP.
All SDP patients already had previous
therapies withheld or withdrawn. SDP
was performed in nine of the 37 centers
in seven of the 17 countries, which was a
minority of centers. Of the SDP patients,
types of medications were available for all
patients, and doses used for SDP were
available for 66 (70%) patients. Table 1
demonstrates the medications and doses
used (if available), the time from SDP
until death, and whether the doctor ad-
ministering the medication believed it
caused the patient’s death. Treatment
modalities used for the patients who un-
derwent SDP included administration of
opiates or benzodiazepines alone or in
combination; four patients also received
muscle relaxants and seven received bar-
biturates. Potassium chloride was not
used in any of the SDP cases. The most
commonly used opiate was morphine (ad-
ministered to 71 patients alone or in
combination), ranging from 5 to 200 mg.
The most commonly used benzodiaz-
epine was diazepam (administered to 54
patients alone or in combination), rang-
ing from 20 to 200 mg. The median dos-
age for morphine was 25.0 mg/hr and for
diazepam 20.8 mg/hr. Although mean
doses of opiates and benzodiazepines
used for SDP were higher than mean
doses used with withdrawing in previous
studies (2, 3), they were no higher in 20
of 66 patients and were within the ranges
of doses used in all but one patient (Table
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2). In retrospect, doctors considered that
the doses of medications they gave for
SDP definitely led to the patient’s death
in 72 patients (77%), probably led to the
patient’s death in 11 (12%), and were
unlikely to have led to the patients death
in 11 (12%) (Table 1).
Withdrawal of endotracheal tubes oc-
curred in 17 of the 94 SDP patients
(18.1%) and 125 (8.9%) of 1,398 patients
who underwent withdrawal of treatment
(p ! .01). In the SDP patients, the me-
dian (IQR) time from the withdrawal of
endotracheal tubes until death was 7.0
hrs (12.4 hrs) vs. 3.5 hrs (6.6 hrs) from
the time of all other withdrawals of treat-
ments until death (p" .05). There was no
difference in the median time to death in
the seven patients with prior limitations
before withdrawal of endotracheal tube—
42.0 hrs (63.6 hrs)—vs. the ten patients
without prior limitations—50.0 hrs
(129.3 hrs).
The median (IQR) time from the first
decision to limit treatment until death
was 14.7 hrs (51.0 hrs). The median (IQR)
time from the decision for the most ac-
tive form of limitation of therapy until
death was 6.6 hrs (30.2 hrs) for all pa-
tients, 14.3 hrs (64.6 hrs) for withhold-
ing, 4.0 hrs (16.2 hrs) for withdrawing,
and 3.5 hrs (7.0 hrs) for SDP (p " .001).
Increasing doses of opiates and benzodi-
azepines were associated with a shorter
time to death (hazard ratio for morphine,
1.10; 95% confidence interval, 1.04–1.16;
hazard ratio for diazepam, 1.12; 95% con-
fidence interval, 1.03–1.22) (Fig. 1).
DISCUSSION
Although end-of-life medical actions
are commonly grouped into distinct cat-
egories, in actual practice they form a
continuum—from aggressive resuscita-
tion to active euthanasia—and the divid-
ing lines between different actions are
not always easy to define. A thorough and
frank discussion of the differences, simi-
larities, and overlaps between different
end-of-life practices is vital to ensure op-
timal and responsible critical care.
An example of the complexity in defin-
ing different categories of ICU care is the
relationship between withholding and
withdrawing life-sustaining therapies.
The conventional ethical view is that
there is no moral distinction between the
two (13), but this belief is not universal
(16), and studies show that some health-
care professionals are more reluctant to
withdraw than withhold therapies (13,
Table 1. Active shortening of the dying process (SDP): medications, doses in morphine and diazepam










1 Morphine, diazepam 1.5 1
2 Sufentanil 33.4 7.5 1
3 Morphine, diazepam 1.75 1
4 Morphine 3.9 1
5 Morphine, diazepam 6.0 1
6 Morphine, diazepam,
pancuronium
11.7 5.9 8.5 1
7 Morphine, diazepam 38.5 15.4 1.3 1
8 Morphine, diazepam 10.5 21.1 4.75 1
9 Sufentanil 66.7 1.5 1
10 Morphine, diazepam 33.3 33.3 3.0 1
11 Morphine, diazepam 7.1 35.7 7.0 1
12 Morphine 2.5 1
13 Morphine, diazepam 1.3 1
14 Morphine, diazepam 4.25 1
15 Morphine, diazepam 59.9 1.67 1
16 Morphine, diazepam 44.4 44.4 2.25 1
17 Sufentanil, midazolam 66.9 20.4 2.75 1
18 Morphine, diazepam 1.5 1
19 Morphine, diazepam 66 40 0.5 1
20 Morphine, diazepam 14.3 14.3 3.5 1
21 Sufentanil 167.2 1.5 1
22 Morphine, diazepam 10.5 42.1 4.75 1
23 Sufentanil, midazolam 2.9 1
24 Sufentanil, midazolam 33.4 13.3 3.0 1
25 Morphine, diazepam 0.4 1
26 Sufentanil, diazepam 66.7 16.7 3.0 1
27 Sufentanil, diazepam 42 15 2.0 1
28 Morphine, diazepam,
thiopental
19 38.1 5.25 1
29 Morphine, diazepam 12.4 1
30 Morphine, diazepam 30 30 2.0 1
31 Morphine, diazepam 120 120 2.0 1
32 Morphine, diazepam 6.0 1
33 Morphine, diazepam 20.4 20.4 4.9 1
34 Sufentanil, pentothal 3.8 1.75 1
35 Morphine, diazepam 200 200 0.5 1
36 Sufentanil 100.1 3.0 1
37 Morphine, diazepam,
thiopental
160 160 0.5 1
38 Morphine, diazepam,
cisatracurium
25 25 4.0 1
39 Morphine, diazepam,
cisatracurium
16.3 4.1 12.3 1
40 Morphine, diazepam 5.0 1
41 Morphine, diazepam 125 125 0.4 1
42 Morphine, diazepam 2.0 1
43 Morphine, diazepam 2.75 1
44 Morphine 0.5 1
45 Morphine, propofol 1.75 1
46 Morphine, diazepam 11.8 7.8 12.75 1
47 Morphine 1.0 1
48 Morphine, diazepam 25 30 2.0 1
49 Morphine, thiopental 800 0.25 1
50 Diazepam 3.5 1
51 Morphine, diazepam,
thiopental
100 200 0.1 1
52 Morphine, diazepam 90.9 1.1 1
53 Morphine, diazepam 10 10 5.0 1
54 Morphine 74.6 0.67 1
55 Morphine, diazepam 12.5 7.5 4.0 1




58 Morphine, diazepam 12.5 4.0 1
59 Morphine, diazepam 25 2.0 1
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17). In fact, different studies have defined
not restarting an intravenous vasopressor
infusion as either withholding (18) or
withdrawing (4).
The blurred line between different cat-
egories is also exemplified by the confu-
sion among physicians, which causes
them to misclassify or misrepresent their
own actions: A U.S. survey suggested that
the actual practice of euthanasia or phy-
sician-assisted suicide in the United
States and other countries may be over-
stated by#20% (19). In the survey, many
oncologists who initially reported that
they had intentionally ended a patient’s
life revealed through in-depth interviews
that in fact they had performed withhold-
ing of life-sustaining treatment or pro-
vided potentially life-shortening narcot-
ics for pain relief, which are neither
euthanasia nor assisted suicide (19).
Only one previous study in neonatal
ICUs specifically evaluated the controver-
sial overlap between the use of potentially
life-shortening drugs and mercy killing
(20). Van der Heide et al. (20) found “a
rather large overlap between decisions to
administer drugs with and without the
intention of hastening death, with re-
spect to the type and dose of the drugs
given, aspects of decision making, [and]
prognostic factors.” They reported that
potentially life-shortening drugs were
given in 37% of 299 deaths; of these, the
possibility that death would be hastened
was taken into account in 52% of pa-
tients, hastening of death was partly in-
tended in 22%, and hastening of death
was explicitly intended in 26% (20). All
respondents who explicitly intended to
hasten death stated that they also acted to
alleviate pain or other symptoms (19).
Median doses of drugs and length of time
by which life was shortened were higher
when hastening death was explicitly in-
tended (20). The authors stated that
whether drugs were administered with or
without the intention of hastening death
was not always clear (20). Wilson et al. (3)
showed that physicians ordered drugs to
hasten death in 39% of cases but always
with other reasons, such as relieving
pain. A Dutch governmental multidisci-
plinary task force on end-of-life decisions
also underlined that hastening death in
patients may be difficult to distinguish
from the palliative effects of drugs (21).
The issue is further complicated by the
fact that medications given concomi-
tantly with withdrawal of therapy may
instead of shortening the time to death
actually sometimes delay an inevitable
death (22, 23).
The purpose of this article is to shed
light on one of the most controversial
areas in end-of-life practices: the lack of
clear or easily determined distinctions
between SDP or euthanasia and therapies
intended to relieve pain and suffering ad-
ministered when withdrawing life-sus-
taining therapies. Differentiation be-
tween the two is complicated and may be
impossible because the physicians’ true
intentions are often difficult to ascertain.
In an emotionally charged, life-and-death
setting, such as the ICU, these intentions
are likely to be multilayered, complex,













250 250 0.2 1
61 Thiopental 0.2 1
62 Morphine, diazepam 6.6 1
63 Sufentanil 66.7 2.0 1
64 Morphine, diazepam 7.7 7.7 13.0 1
65 Sufentanil, midazolam 133.4 40 3.25 1
66 Sufentanil, diazepam 100.1 100 2.0 1
67 Morphine, diazepam 11.4 11.4 3.5 1
68 Morphine, diazepam 20 20 5.0 1
69 Morphine, diazepam 37.5 37.5 4.0 1
70 Diazepam 44.4 2.25 1
71 Morphine 1.2 25.0 1
72 Morphine 30 1.5 1
73 Sufentanil, diazepam 8.0 2
74 Morphine, diazepam 3.1 2
75 Morphine, diazepam 3.4 3.4 11.75 2
76 Morphine 7.5 10.0 2
77 Benzodiazepine, opioids 0.6 2
78 Morphine, midazolam 8 16 8.75 2
79 Morphine, midazolam 10 1.1 8.5 2
80 Midazolam 2.1 2.1 9.5 2
81 Morphine 3.1 6.5 2
82 Morphine 8.5 4.25 2
83 Morphine 1.2 16.5 2
84 Morphine 2.6 3
85 Sufentanil, midazolam 41.7 10 1.25 3
86 Sufentanil 190.1 4.75 3
87 Sufentanil 33.4 1.0 3
88 Morphine 10 6.2 3
89 Fentanyl 6.7 8.75 3
90 Morphine 2.3 22.0 3
91 Morphine, diazepam 92 3
92 Fentanyl, propofol 10.65 3
93 Morphine 12 0.5 3
94 Morphine 0.1 29.1 3
aMedication definitely (1), probably (2), or probably not (3) caused the patient’s death. The median
times from SDP to death were 3.0 hrs (for definitely), 8.5 hrs (for probably), and 6.2 hrs (for probably
not) (p " .05).
Table 2. Medications given during active shortening of the dying process in ETHICUS and during
withholding and withdrawing in other studies
ETHICUS
(n ! 66)
Wilson et al. (3)
(n ! 33)
Keenan et al. (2)
(n ! 359)
Opiate—morphine equivalent mg/hr
Mean $ SD 59.3 $ 108.3 11.2$ 11.5 21.0$ 33.0
Median 25 — 14.4
Range 0.1–800 — 0.7–350
Benzodiazepine—diazepam
equivalent, mg/hr
Mean $ SD 46.0 $ 60.8 9.8 $ 18.4 8.6$ 11.0
Median 20.8 — 14.4
Range 1.1–250 — 0.7–350
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Figure 2 demonstrates the spectrum
of actions between palliative care and eu-
thanasia. Palliative care is given to relieve
pain and suffering with doses of drugs
that are usually inadequate to shorten a
patient’s life but may at times hasten
death without the intent to do so. Eutha-
nasia or SDP occurs when a doctor ad-
ministers drugs in doses adequate to
shorten a patient’s life with the explicit
intent to hasten death. Differentiation
may be difficult as intentions are subjec-
tive and private and only self-reporting or
an analysis of extreme actions will be
determinant (12). This study is one of the
few that prospectively recorded the inten-
sivists’ intentions along with their prac-
tices. The most striking finding of the
study was that although doses of opioids
and benzodiazepines reportedly used to
shorten the dying process with the inten-
tion to cause death were higher than
those used for symptom relief in earlier
studies (2, 3), mean doses in close to one
third of patients were similar and ranges
for all patients were analogous to those in
earlier studies. Surprisingly, the time to
death for SDP patients was not different
than that for patients in whom with-
drawal was performed. This is probably
related to the fact that doses of drugs
used for SDP were not sufficient to cause
an immediate death. Some physicians
who performed SDP may have thought of
their actions as “the double effect” and
not as euthanasia despite the definition.
An important finding of this study was
that larger doses used for SDP did, how-
ever, correlate with a quicker death. Pre-
vious smaller studies have not shown a
correlation between higher doses of nar-
cotics and/or benzodiazepines and
shorter patient survival (22, 26). Al-
though the practices of palliative care and
SDP are very different, distinguishing the
two may be extremely difficult.
The confusion in end-of-life decisions
is also seen within the SDP patients. All
doctors explicitly intended to hasten
death in SDP patients. In a retrospective
evaluation of these actions based on doses
of medications given and the length of
time until death, the actions were not so
clear. Physicians believed that the doses
they gave were definitely the cause of
death in 77% of patients, probably the
cause in 12%, and probably not the cause
in 11%. It is recognized that absolute
doses may not be indicative of euthanasia
or SDP, because prior exposure, toler-
ance, and duration of medications are
important. Inadequate doses of drugs
might be related to a doctor’s feelings of
guilt or fear of prosecution and may ex-
plain the surprising finding that even
when SDP was intended, patients took
several hours to die, almost as long as
cases of in therapy withdrawal. Another
unexpected discovery was that extubated
patients lived longer than nonextubated
patients. These findings suggest that the
gray area between relief measures and
SDP extends in both directions: While in
some cases physicians may be hastening
the patient’s death by providing what is
classified as relief measures, in other
cases physicians supposedly intending to
cause death may in fact be providing
drugs that are only capable of relieving
pain and suffering. Therefore, the distinc-
tion between therapies intended to re-
lieve pain and suffering and those in-
tended to cause death may not be as clear
as previously thought.
A major strength of the present study
is that it provides empirical data for an
ethical debate that often remains theoret-
ical due to scarcity of facts. Other strong
features include the prospective design,
enrollment of a large number of consec-
utive patients from 37 ICUs in 17 coun-
tries, evaluation of all limitations and
deaths in all admitted patients, and anal-
ysis of the intent and self-reporting of
actions rather than theoretical responses
to a questionnaire. Anonymity and con-
temporaneous documentation probably
resulted in honest and more accurate re-
porting.
There are, however, limitations to the
present study. Drug doses were not avail-
able for some of the SDP patients and for
Figure 1. Time from shortening of dying process (SDP) to death according to the doses of the
medication (morphine and diazepam equivalents, mg/hr) administered (quartiles). This analysis
includes only observations where no drugs other than morphine or diazepam were used.
Figure 2. The spectrum of actions between palliative care and euthanasia.
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patients who had therapies withheld or
withdrawn. There may have been a selec-
tion bias in the doses that were reported.
In addition, participants by their special
interest in ethical issues may not neces-
sarily share the attitudes of unselected
ICU physicians. Severity scores of the pa-
tients were not analyzed, and underre-
porting of practices for fear of legal ram-
ifications cannot be excluded.
The present report provides evidence
that some physicians may be giving much
larger doses of medications than needed
for relief of pain or suffering so that the
patient can die with dignity, but these
physicians do not call this practice eutha-
nasia. Yet in fact, physicians administer-
ing these perfectly legal relief treatments
may in fact consciously or unconsciously
be practicing a disguised form of mercy
killing. It is unclear how many physicians
or nurses around the world, in providing
relief measures to terminal patients, also
intend to shorten the dying process.
This complex empirical picture of ac-
tual ICU practice, rather than an ideal-
ized list of distinct, neatly separated ac-
tions, should form the basis for an open
discussion of end-of-life practices. We
need to arrive at a level of transparency at
which proper safeguards for end-of-life
medical care (18, 22) can be developed
and maintained. Palliation with poten-
tially life-shortening drugs may be given
with no intent, partial intent, or explicit
intent to hasten death. Markedly increas-
ing doses of these drugs may be consid-
ered homicide by some and an appropri-
ate form of terminal care by others.
Physicians should administer drugs in
sufficient amounts to relieve pain and
suffering because the importance of pal-
liative care cannot be overemphasized,
but the drugs should not be intended to
directly cause death (12). Physicians
must recognize that appropriate pallia-
tive care may lead to a patient’s death
although unintended. One important
safeguard should be proper documenta-
tion of the use of potentially life-shorten-
ing measures, including keeping records
on the timing and doses of the drug and
the physician’s intention at each step.
Such documentation can help protect
the physician wrongly accused of deliber-
ately ending a patient’s life. No less im-
portant, it may reduce the use of inappro-
priately large doses of medications to
shorten the dying process given in the
guise of relieving pain and suffering.
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